Cole Maimone

How Trade Secrets Harm Global Interests

by
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Why the World Trade Organization Should Limit Overly Broad Trade Secret Protections.

Summary

This article examines the global expansion of trade secret protections and their broader consequences for innovation, developing economies, and public health. Comparing approaches across several jurisdictions, it argues that increasingly broad protections can restrict employee mobility, market entry, and the exchange of valuable knowledge. The article proposes that the World Trade Organization provide guidance establishing appropriate limits on trade secret protection, with particular attention to employee confidentiality agreements.

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Table of Contents

The World Trade Organization (WTO) ought to issue guidance limiting the breadth of protection trade secrets are afforded. As a result of prior guidance and treaties, countries have begun enacting increasingly broad trade secret protections overtime. This ongoing expansion harms developing nations, stifles innovation, and risks global public health. The WTO ought to counterbalance this development by recommending trade secret protection limits at upcoming Ministerial Conferences. This article further argues that employee confidentiality and non-compete agreements are ripe ground for limiting trade secret protections.

Part I introduces trade secrets and the challenges inherent in studying and regulating them. Part II situates the issue within the institutional framework of the WTO and the interpretive history of The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Article 39. Part III compares trade secret regimes across developed and developing jurisdictions, showing how protections have escalated worldwide. Part IV analyzes the consequences of overbroad secrecy, including reduced market entry, curtailed employee mobility, the suppression of negative knowledge, and concealment of vital pharmaceutical data. Part V proposes that, while amending TRIPS itself may be politically infeasible, the WTO should place trade secret limitations on the Ministerial Conference agenda and issue guidance standardizing practices such as non-disclosure agreements. Part VI concludes by summarizing the Article and restating the solutions presented. In doing so, the paper lays the groundwork for future scholarship and international policymaking on balancing secrecy with transparency, innovation, and public welfare.

I. Introduction

Healthcare costs have long been a source of controversy in public and private sectors. Last year, the United States government shut down entirely for a period of 43 days, with healthcare costs a primary point of contention.1 As of 2023, healthcare costs in the United States are estimated to comprise 17.6% of its Gross Domestic Product, and $14,570 per person of the average household income.2 Nevertheless, information as to the actual cost of medication is inscrutable, with a complex system of drug manufacturers, insurers, doctors, pharmacy benefit managers, and distributing pharmacies forming a complex web of rebates and discounts.3 Prior attempts at untangling these rebates to obtain the final cost of a drug after manufacture has proven elusive, with insurers insulating themselves from disclosure via trade secret laws. 

Pharmaceutical companies and insurers have claimed a broad right to confidentiality to shield this data, despite its importance to both consumers and government entities. Conflict continues, not only to whether naked prices constitute a trade secret, but whether trade secrets are protected from regulation-mandated disclosure.4 This ongoing controversy is emblematic of recent and ongoing developments in trade secret jurisprudence on a global scale: that trade secret protection has steadily expanded, and will continue to do so, as countries attempt to act as safe harbors for various companies. However, this gradual expansion hampers international economic development and innovation. 

It is useful to define the traditional meaning of trade secrets before entering a full discussion as to how they have been expanded. The technical definition is meek, relative to its current application. A trade secret is described in international law as a piece of information deriving commercial value from the continuing secrecy the owner places the information under.5 However, the term ‘piece of information’ has been widely interpreted in recent years, such as customer lists, manufacturing methods, marketing strategies, know-how, and technical information and, as alleged by pharmaceutical companies, the actual prices paid for a drug.6

Trade secret protections are defined in TRIPS Art. 39 as “. . . preventing information lawfully in [the owner’s] control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without their consent in a manner contrary to honest business practices . . . .”7

Trade secrets are inherently difficult to form conclusions about. A trade secret is protected so long as it is, in fact, secret. If a company makes no effort to keep the information secret, the information is not protected. For example, a CEO may distribute a proprietary marketing strategy so long as the recipients sign a confidentiality agreement. The strategy would retain trade secret protection. In contrast, if the marketing strategy was distributed publicly, or without a confidentiality agreement, it would lose protection.8 Mandatory secrecy makes objective analysis of the underlying information difficult. After all, trade secrets available for empirical analysis are no longer trade secrets. Scholarship requires a roundabout analysis of global and regional effects, rather than a direct analysis.9 Companies have wide latitude in what information is even considered a trade secret.10

With only limited data available, assessment must instead be made based on (1) the national policies of TRIPS signatory nations, (2) the changes of those policies over time, and (3) the subsequent effect those policy changes have had on trade secret protections. Once the international trend of trade secret protections has been analyzed in context of international effects, policy recommendations may be made to alter trade secret policy to conform with societal benefit.

When protection becomes excessive, secrecy can come at the expense of innovation, competition, and public welfare.

II. Background

Prior to ratification of TRIPS, trade secret protections were dependent on  a country’s individual policies. However, advanced nations lobbied the WTO to export Western intellectual property protection into developing nations. By doing so, the WTO would enable developed nations to retain the benefits of innovation and export into developing countries, without the cost of disclosure.11 For example, a company may have a secret formula, protected as a trade secret in the United States. However, in India, the company may be required to publicly disclose the secret formula. Thus, if the company expands into India, it will have to publicly disclose its secret formula, losing its protection in America due to the formula no longer being secret. The company is therefore faced with a choice: either decline to expand into India, or expand and lose its protection in America. 

This forced decision gave significant concern about how effective trade secret protection in developed nations actually was, especially for domestic companies that sought to expand internationally.12 Companies must either risk disclosure of their trade secrets or opt to stay out of foreign markets lacking trade secret protections. To alleviate this, the WTO enacted TRIPS at the behest of developed nations. TRIPS, in mandating all WTO member nations provide some trade secret protection, help ease access to foreign markets that might not otherwise protect trade secrets.

Since ratification and entering effect on 1 January 1995, TRIPS has been regarded as largely successful in expanding intellectual property protections in developing nations.13 However, there are concerns that it is failing in one of its goals to enable transfer of technology to developing nations.14 The mandate for trade secret protection, found in TRIPS Article 39, is emblematic of this weakness.15

Article 39 requires nations to adopt a minimal definition of trade secrets, that a trade secret is information (1) a secret not generally known or accessible, (2) has commercial value as a result of its secrecy, and (3) has been subject to reasonable steps to keep it secret. Information meeting these broad criteria is protected from disclosure, acquisition, or use by others without proper permission, or else in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices.16 Article 39 further enables WTO members to require disclosure of pharmaceutical products for regulatory purposes, though mandating that the disclosed information is protected from public release. In rare instances, member nations can publicly disclose this pharmaceutical data, though only where necessary to protect the public or where proper steps have been taken to protect the information from unfair commercial use.17

Since the passage of TRIPS, Art. 39 has seen little interest within national courts. However, international courts have agreed that Art. 39 establishes minimum protection trade secrets are afforded. Countries are deemed to comply with TRIPS Art. 39 merely by adopting TRIPS. This agreement spans common law and civil law jurisdictions. 

In Tianrui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, the U.S. Federal Circuit Court found that the trade secret requirements of TRIPS are essentially indistinguishable from those of US common law, and vice versa.18 Where a country has not yet passed legislation conforming with the requirements of Art. 39, adoption of TRIPS is nevertheless legislature enabling trade secret protections, as per both the Delhi High Court of India and the Supreme Court of the People’s Republic of China, reasoning that Indian and Chinese law ought to be interpreted in light of TRIPS.19

Further, even where a WTO member nation has existing trade secret law, courts have interpreted the preexisting law as complying with the minimum standards of TRIPS. For example, European Union courts have repeatedly found that, even in keeping with a policy of disclosure and transparency, Art. 39 mandates countries keep information confidential if it could fall within Art. 39 application. In Deza, a.s. v. European Chemicals Agency, the European Union court found that Art. 39 (3) prevent EU law from requiring disclosure of testing that is otherwise a trade secret, as such a law conflicts with the TRIPS requirement to protect such information except when necessary for public protection.20 Further, MSD Animal Health Innovation and Intervet International v. EMA found that TRIPS allows some disclosure of testing results, leaving required disclosures intact.21 While the court in EMA declined to detail the factors in the balancing test, it nevertheless shows that secrecy interests are significant as mandated by TRIPS. 

While Art. 39 jurisprudence is limited, it nevertheless confirms Art. 39 as the lowest level of protection for trade secrets signatory nations must guarantee. Should a nation provide less than the mandated minimum protection, Art. 39 acts as a gap-filled and provides trade secret protection. As will be shown, Art. 39 merely establishes a lower bound; member nations are free to increase protection well beyond what is mandated by TRIPS. 

TRIPS established a global floor for trade secret protection, but not a ceiling.

III. Escalation in Application

In the 20 years since the passage of TRIPS, there have been significant development in international economic development. 20 years is an ideal period of time to retrospectively analyze the effects TRIPS, being both close enough to the inception of TRIPS to be relevant, while also allowing enough time for bureaucracy to enact change to comply with TRIPS. This article, focused on how TRIPS alters the development of trade secrets, compares legislation before and after TRIPS Art. 39. Four nations are analyzed, each emblematic of the effects of TRIPS on nations of varying economic development:

(1) The United States (US) is used as an example of a highly developed nation that already has strong trade secret protections when TRIPS is passed;

(2) The European Union (EU), while not a singular nation, broadly unifies intellectual property protections across its member nations, and is emblematic of an advanced nation with few trade secret protections; 

(3) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is an example of a nation that, especially in the time since TRIPS was passed, transitioned from a developing nation into a developed nation; 

(4) The Republic of India (India) is an example of a nation in development at the time TRIPS was passed, and still in development, though rapidly developing. 

By analyzing a number of different nations, each with different relationships with trade secrets before and after TRIPS, an overall trend can be identified.

1. United States

The US serves as an example of a highly developed national economy, developed both before and after TRIPS was established.22 Further, the US had strong trade secret protection before TRIPS was enacted.23 In the time since, trade secret protections have only strengthened in the US.

Prior to TRIPS, the US relied on the common law cause of action for trade secret misappropriation at the state level. A federal cause of action did not exist at the time, instead relying on a state claim for misappropriation of trade secrets. Further, such a claim found its basis primarily in standard tort law, rather than as a defined area of intellectual property law.24 Otherwise, US trade law protections mirrored those in TRIPS, providing protection for the same sort of information in the same sort of circumstances. 

In the years following passage of TRIPS, there has been only minor change to the principles in US protections for trade secrets. This is to be expected; the US was the primary mover for implementation of TRIPS, and US law served as the basis on which TRIPS Art. 39 was based.25 The criteria for trade secrets, and the extent of information remains similar, building upon the common law foundations that previously existed. It is worth noting three changes to US trade secret protection that came about in the passage of the Defend Trade Secrets Act in 2016. The Defend Trade Secrets Act creates a federal cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets, expanding access to the courts for plaintiffs and formalizing the preexisting common law basis for a trade secret misappropriation claim. The Defend Trade Secrets Act further created a new remedy for the newly created claim: ex parte seizure of assets. Courts gain enormous power in light of this development: without the presence of the defendant, the court may order US marshals to seize materials, such as paperwork, laptops, and other media storage.26 Such extreme action is rarely otherwise authorized by US law, representing a keen interest in US policy makers to protect trade secrets, to the extent of shifting much of the risks and costs of bringing a lawsuit to the alleged infringer.27

Finally, the Defend Trade Secrets act did provide some limited reduction in trade secret protections, making allowances for whistleblowers to disclose otherwise protected information, so long as it is done to report suspected illegal activity under seal, either to government entities or an attorney.28 In such a situation, the whistleblower is protected from the newly created cause of action. It is, however, important to read this provision in the context of the Defend Trade Secrets Act as a whole, notably the ex parte procedure.29 While including whistleblower protections is admirable, the actual protections ring hollow when a plaintiff may seize ex parte important assets of the defendant prior to the defendant having an opportunity to defend themselves. While an ex parte action is extreme and requires judicial approval to take, the mere threat nevertheless has a chilling effect, such that the whistleblower provision is significantly limited in its actual application.30

With the US, the very country that wished to implement TRIPS Art. 39, and the nation on which Art. 39 is based, it is reasonable that TRIPS has not had a significant impact on US trade secret law. However, trade secret protections have nevertheless expanded in the US in the years since the passage of TRIPS, and the implementation of Art. 39. This increase in protection is indicative of the modern trend that TRIPS forecasted when it was first implemented: that trade secret protections are on the rise. 

2. European Union

The EU serves as an example of a collective union of countries with otherwise disparate laws. This sort of economic system is important to represent, as not only is the EU is itself a large trading bloc, but serves as a microcosm for TRIPS itself, with trade secret law of member nations superseded by the law of the collective. In recent years, trade unions have proliferated; further, the EU itself has grown since the passage of TRIPS, from 14 member nations at the time TRIPS was passed, to 27 as of 2025.31

Prior to TRIPS, the EU had no set policy regarding trade secrets, instead relying entirely on its member nations to supply their own trade secret protections. However, member nations declined to enact legislation protecting, or even recognizing, trade secrets. An EU research commission discovered in 2011 that “most Member States do not treat trade secrets as intellectual property.” Italy serves as the sole total exception, with England, Finland, France, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic serving as limited exceptions.32 Facially, the remaining nations of the EU might seem to be out of compliance with TRIPS Art. 39. However, in such cases TRIPS Art. 39 has acted as a gap filler, establishing trade secret protections in those nations that had not otherwise adopted such protection. As such, declining to enact protection for trade secrets is a bit of a misnomer; such protections did not exist prior to TRIPS’ passage, at which time protection became the minimum mandated by TRIPS Art. 39.33

Nevertheless, the EU, in keeping with the modern trend of strengthening trade secret protections, enacted the Directive on Protection of Trade Secrets in 2016 (the Directive), seeking to harmonize the variety of acquisition, disclosure, and redress procedures that varied throughout the EU.34 The Directive mirrors TRIPS in its definition of a trade secret. Unlike TRIPS, the Directive lays out specific acts that are deemed lawful acquisition of trade secrets, namely (1) independent discovery, (2) reverse engineering, or (3) any other practice conforming with honest business practices. The Directive further attempts to provide safeguards for disclosure of trade secrets for the purposes of freedom of expression, revealing illegal activity, or protecting a legitimate interest recognized by the EU. The Directive nevertheless uses a catch-all for acts which would fall under trade secret protection, defining the acts as, inter alia, conduct considered contrary to honest commercial practices.35

Member states to the EU have varied in their exact implementation of the Directive, especially in light of pre-existing law surrounding TRIPS Art. 39. Under the Directive, member nations have broad discretion in what steps a business must take to keep its trade secrets confidential. However, countries must nevertheless ensure this discretion meets the requirements of TRIPS. While the EU has taken admirable steps to allow member nations to determine their own trade secret policy, the Directive’s passage represents a uniform increase in trade secret protection for EU member states.36

3. People’s Republic of China

The PRC serves as an excellent example of a nation whose economy has transitioned from a “developing” nation, to a fully “developed” nation, per the standards of the WTO. Since joining the WTO in 2001, the PRC has been classified as a “developing” nation, recognizing a low GDP. Since that time, the PRC economy has grown significantly, drawing criticism from foreign governments that it is no longer eligible for the advantages of developing nation status, and should instead be treated as a developed nation.37 In response to this pressure, the PRC has recently voluntarily abandoned the “developing” nation status and has embraced its status as a WTO developed nation.38 As a nation that joined the WTO in the early days of TRIPS, and has since become a developed economy, the PRC serves as an idea example of the effects TRIPS has had on the trade secret law in evolving economies. 

Prior to TRIPS, the PRC relied on the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the PRC (AUCL), passed in 1993, for initial establishment and protection of trade secrets. The AUCL spoke of trade secrets only in very broad terms, and was further supplemented by the Labor Law of the PRC in 1995, requiring laborers to follow professional ethics, including a duty to maintain trade secrets.39 The advent of these protections is largely contributed to two factors: economic pressure from the US via a 1992 memorandum of understanding and the ongoing economic development and global integration of the PRC incentivizing protection of trade secrets.40 Nevertheless, the PRC’s policies were criticized for not sufficiently protecting trade secrets, despite the memorandum of understanding. For example, the AUCL and later supplementation lack any criminal liability for misappropriation of trade secrets, representing far less stringent enforcement of the existing trade secret protections.41 Further, recent analysis of law predating modern PRC trade secret law has criticized a (1) limited scope of protection due to practical application requirement, (2) application primarily to business actors, rather than individuals, (3) low damage awards, and (4) lack of preliminary injunction.42

Despite joining the WTO in 2001, the PRC nevertheless avoided strengthening its trade secret protections for some years until 2017. Even then, the alterations to the AUCL were minimal, primarily removing the practice value requirement for a trade secret, and making third parties liable when they knowingly make use of trade secrets.43

The majority of changes have been jurisprudential in nature, with the Supreme People’s Court responsible for broadening the scope of protection.44 The breadth of increase in scope is notable, showing how limited PRC trade secret protections were prior to the court’s decision. The Supreme People’s Court decision was far reaching: 

(1)  broadened the scope of protection,
(2)  relaxed standards of reasonable protective measures,
(3)  lessened stringent secrecy requirements, 
(4)  eased evidentiary requirements,
(5)  created a presumption of comprehensive, rather than select, infringement, 
(6)  eliminated the tangible media requirement,
(7)  increased liability for infringement,
(8)  increased in damages, and 
(9)  enabled parallel civil and criminal proceedings.45

These recent changes significantly broaden trade secret protections. This follows with the modern trend towards increasing the breadth of trade secret protections, coupled with an increase in liability for infringement of trade secrets. 

4. Republic of India

India serves as the final example of a nation increasing trade secret protections. India is classified by the WTO as a developing country, with the intention of transitioning to a high-income economy by 2047, requiring an average growth rate of 7.8% for two decades to achieve this result.46 In this way, India is representative of countries in the ongoing stages of economic transformation, with a long-term view towards full development. 

India has never directly legislated trade secrets, either in their defining or enforcement of protection. Rather, trade secret protections are based in a common law jurisprudence. In the absence of specific legislation, actions to protect trade secrets are based on action for violation of contractual agreements.47 The 1872 Indian Contract Act is the typical civil remedy for a violation of confidentiality agreements. Enforcement can also take place via criminal statutes, though this requires actual theft of material, rather than mere disclosure. The lack of uniform law and reliance on contractual obligations and actual theft of materials, rather than theft of intellectual property, makes trade secrets protection enforcement exceedingly difficult, with no defined set of remedies available.48 While injunctions as a remedy are available, these are based in equity, rather than in specific legal provisions.49

With no domestic law specifically handling trade secrets, the Delhi High Court has used TRIPS as a de facto common law in India. The court reasoned that Indian law is presumed to already comply with the TRIPS agreement, because no changes were made in response to TRIPS, and so ought to be interpreted in light of TRIPS. As such, the requirements of TRIPS are included in the common law of India, despite no substantive changes to India’s trade secret law since the passage of TRIPS.50 Despite the evident existence of trade secret protections in compliance with TRIPS, India has nevertheless proposed the Protection of Trade Secrets Bill, indicating important considerations and developments in Indian trade secret law. If passed, it would represent India’s first trade secret legislation.51 The main provisions of relevance include (1) Clarification of what a trade secret is, keeping it in line with TRIPS requirements, (2) Ways trade secrets can be lawfully obtained, (3) Rights, Use, and Disclosure of trade secrets, (4) Compulsory Licensing, and (5) defining misappropriation.52 By virtue of the Indian law already complying with TRIPS, the currently considered legislation is indicative of a desire to at least clarify, if not increase, protections that India affords trade secrets.

Across a wide variety of nations and national collectives, trade secret protections have been enhanced by a variety of means. These means have included granting additional jurisdiction to courts, expanding the definition of a trade secret, and impugning greater liability upon defendants of such actions, including ex parte liability. 

Across jurisdictions, the trajectory has been remarkably consistent: trade secret protection has expanded.

IV. Effects of Global Increase in Trade Secret Protection

Trade secrets when applied on a global scale and in increasingly international markets pose a significant risk to international economic development. While the trend towards furthering trade secret protections has long been lauded as a means to encourage economic and international development, the downsides of such a system ignore the significant downsides of an ever-increasing deference towards trade secret protection. The dangers of an increasingly trade secret friendly world are exemplified in three areas: (1) harm to developing nations, (2) reduction in global innovation, and (3) danger to global public health. 

a. Developing Nations

Strong trade secret protections internationally pose several difficulties for developing nations that are attempting to grow their economy, both through development of domestic industry, and through importing foreign companies to bring their technologies and capacity to the developing nation. 

The global proliferation of trade secrets significantly harms developing nations domestically. For example, developing nations are typically not yet able to leverage the domestic advantages of protecting trade secrets. Nevertheless, they are incentivized to accept trade secret protections, along with the downsides of those protections, due to outside influence, such as developed nations and TRIPS.

Disadvantages include slowed growth. In cases of such developing nations, it has been shown that the sector allegedly protected by trade secrets experiences slowed growth relative to an ‘unprotected’ sector.53 The domestic markets of developed nations are not untouched either. A 2021 paper found that in US states with greater trade secret protections, there was a significant outsourcing effect correlated with the trade secret protections. This effect is significant enough that states are expected to see a 29% increase in outsourcing should the strictest set of trade secret laws found in the US be implemented across the nation.54

Further, trade secrets have been shown to inhibit entry into new markets by potential competitors.55 Traditionally, knowledge such as losses and profits have been protected as trade secrets. However, maintaining these as trade secrets inhibits competitor entry into a developing market, driving down job growth and industrial development, in addition to enabling non-competitive pricing. Complacency can further occur, in which a company feels safe in its trade secret portfolio, having no need to further innovate if the trade secret sufficiently isolates it from competition.56 While these consequences are felt by all nations, developing nations are hit particularly hard.

b. Global Innovation

Global innovation is hindered and slowed by a protectionist environment. Global innovation relies on the free exchange of information and personnel. In a protectionist trade secret society, this free flow is inhibited, causing stagnation. New companies are heavily reliant on new employees with pre-existing skills and knowledge to thrive, with this fluidity characterized as essential.57 If employees are restricted in mobility and information they can later use, new companies become rarer. Absence of a non-compete agreement increases employee mobility by 10% relative to existence of a non-compete agreement.58 Non-compete and non-disclosure clauses are a method of trade secret restriction that stops this free flow of information and makes it more difficult for start-ups to successfully form, limiting the market and innovation that occurs.59

Further, existing intellectual property protections, such as patent protection, presently exists and “lur[es] secret inventions out of the dark, shadowy cave of trade secrecy, and into the bright, public sunlight of the patent system”.60 The quid pro quo of the patent system is protection for disclosure; trade secrets effectively create the opposite incentive, with protection entirely reliant on non-disclosure.61 The goal of disclosure is to disclose information the public may not otherwise gain access to.62

Additionally, companies incur significant wastage by investing time in developmental routes that have already been secretly proven failures. Negative trade secrets represent knowledge in what doesn’t work, rather than what does; essentially what failed and how a company learned from those failures.63 This in essence forces recreation of work, especially in the context of employee mobility, as where the failed experiment is treated as a trade secret, the employee must perform the experiment again with their new employer so that the information is independently developed.64

c. Global Public Health

In recent years, companies have used trade secret laws as a means to hide potentially harmful information.65 Pharmaceutical companies prove the clearest example of such behavior, having used trade secrets to shield results of their internal research for efficacy and health effects. This leads to safety concerns being known to the manufacturer, potentially the regulatory body overseeing the manufacturer, but not the end consumer who is actually at risk of potential adverse effects.66

In 2020, the world was rocked by an unprecedented pandemic. The Covid-19 pandemic represented one of the largest threats to global health in modern history. Despite the pressing need for preventative vaccines, pharmaceutical nevertheless prioritized trade secrecy, incurring the above mentioned costs at a dangerous time in global history, and further undermining public trust in the vaccines that were subsequently developed and released.67 Further, safe harbor in trade secrets makes independent verification of regulatory body approval incredibly difficult, if not outright impossible, increasing the risk of otherwise dangerous drugs being released and taking years for their danger to be discovered.68 As a result, there have been increasing calls not only for the reduction in trade secret protection of pharmaceutical data, but a full rollback of these protections.69

This problem is not limited to the pharmaceutical industry, however. The contents of environmental discharge have been alleged as a trade secret, arguing that the fluids discharged are subject to trade secret protection. Fracking contaminant identification has seen a significant source of litigation in this area, in which companies with fracking operations have spent significant funds and litigation efforts to prevent disclosure of the fluid used in fracking. However, the fluid used inevitably enters the groundwater at the drilling site, causing contamination of municipal wells. Nevertheless, the industry maintains the fracking fluid is a trade secret, and so they are protected from disclosure, despite the fluid inevitably entering the groundwater and contaminating drinking sources.70

What protects proprietary knowledge can also restrict the movement of people, ideas, and innovation.

V. The Solution

The problems around trade secrets are many and varied, and the severity of these effects can be expected to continue to grow in tandem with the increasing prevalence and severity of trade secret protections in developed and developing countries. Factors such as international pressure and TRIPS, which is itself a result of international pressure, encourage nations to adopt trade secret protections where they otherwise may not. Unfortunately, there is little to be done about international pressure, as countries will pursue their own interests, and the interests of companies housed within those countries. However, the WTO and TRIPS itself present an opportunity to address the dangers of trade secret protection proliferation. To that end, the WTO should issue guidance advocating for limiting trade secret protections, with limiting employee confidentiality agreements being the first target for such action, especially in the context of whistleblowers or public health actions. 

The WTO has an established Intellectual Property division, responsible for (1) IP dispute resolution, (2) negotiations on IP matters, and (3) assist WTO members in technical cooperation, and is the proper division to analyze Trade Secret related matters.71 This division then makes recommendations to the ministerial conference.

The ministerial conference is the highest body of decision making within the WTO, meeting every two years. It is responsible for large-scale decision making regarding multilateral agreements. It is the source of treaties such as TRIPS.72 For the ministerial conference to then advance treaties, international agreements, and guidance, the WTO must reach a consensus, consisting of a simple majority with no dissenting votes.73 Suffice to say, changing TRIPS itself is an extraordinarily complicated process, with no amendments made in over 20 years. Instead, the biannual ministerial conference provides an excellent venue for the WTO to signal a desire to limit the expanding extent of trade secret protections and establishing persuasive authority for later court decisions involving TRIPS Art. 39.74

By focusing on the topic of the ministerial conference on safeguarding employees subject to confidentiality, the WTO addresses several of the points of concern the increase in trade secrets has raised. Safeguarding employee mobility enables reduces the barrier of entry for new companies to form in developing nations, thereby increasing competition within those markets. Further, enabling employee mobility allows for the free flow of information, along with avoiding the wastage problem negative trade secrets present. Finally, formalizing whistleblower protection, especially in the case of a former employee, protects global public health by enabling former employees to come forward with information believed to show wrongdoing by their former employer. 

This topic is more acceptable in the eyes of the nations most intensely advocating for increased protection, namely, the US and, to a lesser extent, the EU. Both these nations have recently ensconced whistleblower protections in their trade secret legislation, indicating a desire to increase disclosure of wrongdoing by employees. While a mild step, the ministerial conference providing guidance on TRIPS is nevertheless a large step forward, and begins the process of limiting TRIPS, which is otherwise a minimum level of protection that all WTO members must meet, as opposed to a maximum that might better protect global economic development, technological advancement, and public health. 

VI. Conclusion

To conclude, trade secrets are a valuable asset for domestic and international economic development. Nevertheless, in recent years trade secret protections have proliferated in an unprecedented manner, broadening in scope, as seen in developed nations, such as the US, and developing nations, such as India. The breadth has increased unbound in large part due to TRIPS Art. 39 requiring minimum protection for trade secrets, but not including a limiting principle. Further, developed nations have put increased pressure on developing nations to add trade secret protections where they otherwise may not have. Due to broadening these protections, numerous adverse effects have been noted, such as inhibiting innovation and preventing competition from forming in developing nations. As such, the WTO ministerial conference ought to promulgate guidance limiting TRIPS’ trade secret protections, specifically within the context of employees subject to confidentiality agreements. 

The WTO can begin restoring the balance by defining meaningful limits on trade secret protection.

References

  1. Anthony Zurcher & Natalie Sherman, Is the US Government Shutdown Over, and Why Did It Happen? BBC (Updated 14 November 2025) ↩︎
  2. National Health Expenditure Data – Historical, United States Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services ↩︎
  3. Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property: Naked Price & Pharmaceutical Trade Secret Overreach, 5 The Judges’ Book (2021) ↩︎
  4. Id. ↩︎
  5. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Art. 39+B9 ↩︎
  6. Katherine Linton, The Importance of Trade Secrets: New Directions in International Trade Policy Making and Empirical Research, United states international trade commission journal of international commerce and economics (September 2016); Jorge Contreras, Definition of a Trade Secret, University of Utah College of Law Research Paper No. 552 (July 27, 2023) ↩︎
  7. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Art. 39 ↩︎
  8. Id. ↩︎
  9. Daniel Bradley, et al., Trade Secret Protection and Product Market Dynamics, 83 Journal of Corporate Finance (2023) ↩︎
  10. Christopher J. Buccafusco et al., Trade Secrecy’s Information Paradox, 100 Notre Dame L. Rev. 925 (2025) ↩︎
  11. Daniele Archibugi & Andrea Filippetti, The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights: Four Learned Lessons and Four Theses, 1 Global Policy (May 2010); Sell SK. The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights Chapter 5: The Intellectual Property Committee and Transnational Mobilization. Cambridge University Press; 2003:96-120 ↩︎
  12. Oleg M. Yaroshenko,et al., Protection of Trade Secrets in Global Markets and International Business: Implications for Labor Relations, 9 Markets, Globalization & Development Review No. 2, Article 4 ↩︎
  13. Alphonso B. Kassor, The World Trade Organizations’ Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement: The Compelling Challenges for Developing and Less Developed Member Countries-Implementation and Enforcement, 9 Cybaris (2018) ↩︎
  14. David M. Fox, Technology Transfer and the TRIPS Agreement Are Developed Countries Meeting Their End of the Bargain?, 10 UC Law Science and Technology Journal (Dec. 13, 2018) ↩︎
  15. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Art. 39 ↩︎
  16. Id. ↩︎
  17. Id. ↩︎
  18. Tianrui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ↩︎
  19. Navigators Logistics Ltd. v. Kashif Quereshi et al., CS(COMM) No.735/2016 (2018) ↩︎
  20. Deza, a.s. v. European Chemicals Agency ECLI:EU:T:2017:4 ↩︎
  21. MSD Animal Health Innovation and Intervet International v. EMA ECLI:EU:C:2019:710 ↩︎
  22. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Economy & Trade ↩︎
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  24. Id.; Jon Chally, The Law of Trade Secrets: Toward a More Efficient Approach, 57 Vanderbilt Law Review (May 2004) ↩︎
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  26. Earthbound Corp. v. MiTek USA, Inc., 2016 WL 4418013, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2016) (ordering Defendants to “immediately deliver to a neutral third-party expert in the greater Seattle area all flash drives, SD cards, cell phones, and other external drives used by the individual defendants . . . that are in Defendants’ possession, custody, or control.”) ↩︎
  27. Yvette Joy Liebesman, Ex Parte Seizures Under the DTSA and the Shift of IP Rights Enforcement, 1 Bus. Entrepreneurship & Tax L. Rev. 383 (2017) ↩︎
  28. Peter Menell, The Defend Trade Secrets Act Whistleblower Immunity Provision: A Legislative History, 1 Bus. Entrepreneurship & Tax L. Rev. 398 (2017) ↩︎
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  31. Gancia, et al. A Theory of Economic Unions, 109 Journal of Monetary Economics 107 (2020) ↩︎
  32. Hogan Lovells International LLP, Report on Trade Secrets for the European Commission (September 23, 2011) ↩︎
  33. Constance Le Grip, Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure, European Union Committee on Legal Affairs, (June 19, 2015) ↩︎
  34. Id. ↩︎
  35. Overview of National and Regional Trade Secret Systems – European Union, World Intellectual Property Organization ↩︎
  36. Bianca Fox, Tripping Over the EU Trade Secret Directive: “Reasonable Steps” to Get Back on Track, 19 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 67 (2020) ↩︎
  37. Department of the State, Report to Congress on the People’s Republic of China’s Status as a Developing Nation, Sept. 2025 ↩︎
  38. Olivia Le Poidevin, China to forego Special and Differential Treatment in future WTO negotiations, Reuters (Sept. 2025) ↩︎
  39. Wu Handong & Research Group of Zhongnan University of Economics & Law, Criminal Protections of Trade Secrets in China, EU-China IPR2 Project (June 2011) ↩︎
  40. Yuan Cheng, Legal Protection of Trade Secrets in the People’s Republic of China, 5 PAC. RIM L & POL’Y J. 261 (1996) ↩︎
  41. Id. ↩︎
  42. Yang Chen, et al., Development of China’s Trade Secrets Law in the US’ Shadow: Negative Consequences for China and Suggestions, 17 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 138 (2022), citing Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2013 Special 301 Report (May 2013), Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2014 Special 301 Report (April 2014), Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2015 Special 301 Report (April 2015), Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2016 Special 301 Report (April 2016), Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2017 Special 301 Report (2017) ↩︎
  43. Shi Bisheng King & Wood Mallesons’ IP Group, Amendment to China’s Anti-Unfair Competition Law (November 14, 2017); Practical Law China, Chinese Anti-Unfair Competition Law: Understanding the 2017 and 2019 Amendments (June 27, 2025) ↩︎
  44. Ye Zhao, et al., Trade Secrets 2025 China – Beijing Trends and Developments, CHAMBERS AND PARTNERS (April 24, 2025) ↩︎
  45. Id.; Supreme People’s Court – Intellectual Property Court, Annual Report of the Intellectual Property Court of the Supreme People’s Court (2022) ↩︎
  46. World Bank Group, India: Accelerated Reforms Needed to Speed up Growth and Achieve High-Income Status by 2047 (2 February 2025) ↩︎
  47. Overview of National and Regional Trade Secret Systems – India, World Intellectual Property Organization ↩︎
  48. Sharad Vadehra, et al. Trade Secret Protection in India: A Comprehensive Overview, Kan & Krishme Law Blog (May 12, 2025) ↩︎
  49. Dr. Sudipta Banerjee vs L.S. Davar & Company & Ors, FMAT 735 of 2021 (High Court at Calcutta, Civil Appellate 2022) ↩︎
  50. Navigators Logistics Ltd. v. Kashif Quereshi et al., CS(COMM) No.735/2016 (2018) ↩︎
  51. The Trade Secret Bill, 2024: A Comprehensive Analysis, Intepat, https://www.intepat.com/blog/the-trade-secret-bill-2024-a-comprehensive-analysis (February 2, 2025) ↩︎
  52. Overview of Protection of Trade Secrets Bill, 2024, European Innovation Council and SMEs Executive Agency, https://intellectual-property-helpdesk.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/overview-protection-trade-secrets-bill-2024-2024-06-06_en (June 6, 2024) ↩︎
  53. Yang Chen, et al., Development of China’s Trade Secrets Law in the US’ Shadow: Negative Consequences for China and Suggestions, 17 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 138 (2022) ↩︎
  54. Gorkem Bostanci, Productivity Gains from Labor Outsourcing: The Role of Trade Secrets, University of Pennsylvania (6 September 2025) ↩︎
  55. W. Nicholson Price, II & Arti K. Rai, Are trade secrets delaying biosimilars? 348 SCIENCE 188-189(2015) ↩︎
  56. Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS (1989) ↩︎
  57. Hanna Bui-Eve, To Hire or Not To Hire: What Silicon Valley Companies Should Know About Hiring Competitors ‘Employees, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 981, 981 (1997) ↩︎
  58. Ivan P. L. Png and Sampsa Samila, Trade Secrets Law and Mobility: Evidence from ‘Inevitable Disclosure’ (February 14, 2015) ↩︎
  59. Kristina L. Carey, Beyond the Route 128 Paradigm: Emerging Legal Alternatives to the Non-Compete Agreement and Their Potential Effect on Developing High-Technology Markets, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. 135 (Spring 2001) ↩︎
  60. J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 921 (2011) ↩︎
  61. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944); Sean B. Seymore, Symposium: The Disclosure Function of the Patent System, 69 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 1455 (2016) ↩︎
  62. Sean B. Seymore, Symposium: The Disclosure Function of the Patent System, 69 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 1455 (2016) ↩︎
  63. Charles Graves, The Law Of Negative Knowledge: A Critique, 15 TEX. PROP. L.J. 387 (Spring 2007) ↩︎
  64. Nicola Searle, The Economic and Innovation Impacts of Trade Secrets, UK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE RESEARCH PAPER NO. 2021/01 (April 19, 2021); Charles Graves, The Law Of Negative Knowledge: A Critique, 15 TEX. PROP. L.J. 387 (Spring 2007) citing Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA LAW REVIEW 519 (2001); Khoury, Amir H., The Case Against the Protection of Negative Trade Secrets: Sisyphus’ Entrepreneurship (December 21, 2013). 54(3) IDEA — THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW 431 (2014) ↩︎
  65. Charles Graves & Sonia Katyal, From Trade Secret to Seclusion, 109 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL (2021) ↩︎
  66. Id. ↩︎
  67. Christopher J. Morten & Amy Kapczynski, The Big Data Regulator, Rebooted: Why and How the FDA Can and Should Disclose Confidential Data on Prescription Drugs, 109 CALIF. L. REV. (2021) ↩︎
  68. Id. ↩︎
  69. Gurgula O, Hull J. Compulsory licensing of trade secrets: ensuring access to COVID-19 vaccines via involuntary technology transfer. Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice. (December 1, 2021) ↩︎
  70. Kellie Fisher, Communities in the Dark: The Use of State Sunshine Laws to Shed Light on the Fracking Industry, 42 BOSTON COLLEGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW (2015) ↩︎
  71. The WTO: Secretariate and Budget Divisions ↩︎
  72. The WTO: Whose WTO is it Anyway? WTO; WTO Ministerial Conference, Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ↩︎
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  74. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)DEC/2 (November 14, 2001); TRIPS Non-Violation and Situation Complaints, WT/MIN(17)66 (December 18, 2017) ↩︎